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Abstract: 
 
We estimate an institutional production function to capture incentive induced growth in 
total factor productivity (TFP) of rice production in Bangladesh. The incentive component 
of TFP assists in explaining farmers’ response to incentives due to major policy reforms 
during 1980s and 1990s. 
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1. Introduction. 
 
We measure the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth in rice production in 
Bangladesh and the incentive component of this growth. We compute the path of TFP 
growth and incentive component of TFP growth over three major policy regimes, 
namely, the input subsidy regime, the output price support regime, and the liberalized 
regime. We examine the incentive induced growth in TFP where the incentive to 
produce more is a result of policy reforms, captured by farmers’ optimal response. We 
attempt to answer an important question: How do farmers respond to incentives? 
 
We find that farmers, in general, respond to incentives, and deregulated markets 
induce farmers to exert more effort in search of higher productivity. Our study clearly 
shows that a major source of productivity growth in agriculture is incentive effects. 
 
2. The Context. 
 
In Bangladesh, during the early eighties a number of reform measures were taken to 
boost up domestic agricultural production and enhance factor productivity. This 
process was followed up by further reforms towards greater liberalized regimes. 
Privatization in factor supply chain and agricultural marketing were introduced and 
flat subsidies were replaced by effective incentive devices in order to promote 
domestic agricultural markets. These key reforms possess a history, and we consult 
various Five-Year Plan Documents of the Ministry of Finance and Planning of the 
Government of Bangladesh in order to present a summary of the history here. 
 
Until 1980, farmers received input subsidy (but no wage subsidy) while the final 
market had a strict measure of quantity rationing. This phase of very low agricultural 
growth, attributable also to low level of technology, can be characterized as one of 
traditional agriculture with overwhelming dependence on weather. This encouraged 
the government to adopt a new input technology package. In addition, until late 
eighties, the government undertook output price support policy which included 
withdrawal of food subsidies in the urban rationing system and withdrawal of 
agricultural input subsidies. One of the main reasons behind the output price support 
policy was that the rate of increase in prices of imported fertilizer and improved seeds 
was persistently higher than the rate of increase in rice price. This difference was 
mainly due to noisy distributional channels for inputs. It was recognized that given the 
weak distributional channels of inputs, when prices fluctuate with output only price 
support policy to stimulate output is often ineffective. In order to improve the 
distributional channels, the government decided to move towards deregulation. 
Starting from 1990, the agricultural reforms can be characterized as ones of regulatory 
reforms of input supply side towards deregulation and liberalization of input supply 
chains, crop diversification, and extended rice research and widening genetic base of 
rice. Instead of mono rice cropping, multi rice cropping and round the year rice 
cropping were introduced. Major policies taken in this period included privatization of 
fertilizer and improved seeds supply, management and distributional reforms of 
fertilizer and irrigation equipment, and changing the output price policy to reflect 
incentive prices rather than procurement prices. Private traders were allowed to import 
diesel engines without taxes or restrictions, couple these engines with domestic pumps 
and pipes, and sell the equipment to farmers. The government removed all import 
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duties and standardization restrictions of power tillers, and eliminated many 
restrictions on pesticide importation. 
 
In this paper we use a simple model to capture farmers’ optimal response to policy 
reforms, where reforms generate incentive to produce more. We follow the approach 
as in Hayami and Ruttan (1985), which McMillan, Whalley and Zhu (1989) and 
Zhang and Carter (1997) use to study agricultural productivity growth in China, and 
Chen, Kompas and Vousden (1999) use to study Vietnamese agriculture. Assuming 
that in transitional economies factor and product prices generally increase at different 
rates with market reform, we characterize this process through a weighted-cost share 
parameter which measures the ratio of average factor to product prices under various 
policy regimes. As is true for most transitional economies, the value of this share-cost 
parameter falls with reform. Changes in factor prices lag behind the increases in 
product prices and the result implies that average per unit profits rise over time. We 
use this line of argument and transform a technical production function into an 
institutional production function that reflects farmers optimal response to institutional 
and policy settings. We estimate it using rice production data for Bangladesh, and use 
the estimates to simulate TFP and its incentive component.  
 
3. The Model. 
 
The level of effort of a farmer is denoted by e , so that for N  workers Ne  is the 
effective contribution of labour to output measured in efficiency units2. We assume 
the technical constant returns to scale (CRTS) production function takes the form 
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Where SFLQr ,,,  represent output of rice, land area under cultivation of rice, 
fertilizers and improved seeds used in producing rice. In per capita terms: 
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We define farm income: 
 
pqm =          (3) 
 
where p  is the market price of rice. Farmer chooses inputs in order to minimize 
costs. With CRTS assumption, the total cost function (TC) is given by: 
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2 We define effort broadly that includes everything that determines the quality of the farmer’s labour as 
well as the willingness to literally exert more effort due to the enhanced incentives that accompany 
economic reform and the removal of externally imposed restrictions on the kinds of tasks a farmer may 
undertake. 
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where 0>x  is a constant, and iw  are the input prices indexed across labour, land, 
fertilizer and improved seeds. With the average real factor price Õ=G
i
a
i
iww)( , the 
cost of production per farmer is given by: 
 
qwC )(G= x          (5) 
 
We define )(wp Gº -1w  as the ratio of observed average factor to product prices. 
With (3), the farmer’s profit function becomes, 
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Farmers like income but dislike the effort of hard work, and their utility function is: 
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The effort-disutility coefficient q  is analogous to the coefficient of risk aversion and 
j  is chosen to guarantee that the utility function jointly quasiconcave. Substituting 
from (2) and (6) gives 
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The farmer chooses effort level to maximize (8). The optimal values for effort level 
satisfy: 
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for )( 1a-= qn . Equations (9) and (2) together imply that the institutional production 
function is: 
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seeds and fertilizers respectively. We define 1
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factor productivity (TFP) coefficient. The institutional production function is assumed 
to capture the farmer’s response to institutional arrangements and government  
policies, through changes in prices p  and the average ratio of input to product prices 
w . With observable data, it is the institutional production function that would be 
estimated rather than the technical production function defined by (1). We use the 
estimates from the institutional production function to decompose TFP into two 
components; the first attributable to incentive effects as captured in the effort 
variables, or 
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and the other 
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which is an unexplained residual reflecting the influence of a host of other factors.  
 
4. Data and Estimation. 
 
We use cross sectional data of 23 major rice producing districts in a given year (1997) 
in order to estimate the institutional rice production function. These data are collected 
from Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics of Bangladesh, a publication of Bangladesh 
Bureau of Statistics (BBS)3. The selected districts have similar cropping intensity. We 
also collect time series data on country-wide aggregate production, input use and 
price from the same source. We present a data appendix that explains the variables we 
use and presents the summary statistics. Figure 1 and figure 2a in appendix presents 
the time series data. 
 
The results from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation of the institutional 
production function are presented in appendix where the share coefficients of labour, 
land, seeds and fertilizer are 0.22, 0.45, 0.17 and 0.15, respectively. These are 
statistically significant at 5% level. Note that since 2
1
211
1
1 aaa qgqgn
-- =-= )()()( , 
the value of the work-disutility coefficient is equal to 3.01339. The computed values 
of ia s are 0.3, 0.41, 0.15 and 0.14 for inputs labour, land, seeds and fertilizer, 
respectively.  With time series data on input prices, one can compute 0370.=x . We 
perform a number of diagnostic tests and their summary are in appendix. All tests of 
heteroscedasticity produced low values of the test statistic, and therefore we accept 
the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity in the distribution of residuals. We conduct 
the Ramsey’s standard tests of specification error, called the RESET (regression 
specification error test). The F  statistics calculated in the RESET are based on R2  
values of the auxiliary and unrestricted regression models. All tests of Ramsey’s 
RESET indicate that the hypothesis of misspecification of the model could not be 
accepted at 5% level of significance. We test the normality of the distribution of 
residuals using the standard Jarque-Bera (JB) test. We accept the normality 
assumption of the distribution of the OLS residuals at 1% level. 
 
5. Total Factor Productivity with Economic Reform. 
 
We use time series data on rice output and inputs for Bangladesh and compute total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth, as Solow residual for each of the years 1979-1998. 
The annual growth rate for total factor productivity ( A ) is calculated in the usual 
growth accounting manner as the difference between the growth of output and the 
growth of each input weighted by share parameters. The resulting estimates of the 
year-by-year growth rates for A  are then used to calculate an index for TFP. 
                                                 
3 The other secondary sources of agricultural data in Bangladesh are the Sustainable Development 
Network of Bangladesh (SDNBD)  and Agricultural Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, both of which are available online, and use our original data source. 
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We present the TFP index and its density and distribution in figure 2a and 2b in 
appendix. We present the TFP growth time path in figure 3. The results are striking. 
Prior to the output price support period of 1982-1989, under highly regulated market 
for inputs where inputs were subsidized, TFP growth rate was negative. During this 
period, with heavily subsidized inputs structure, there was no incentive for farmers to 
enhance factor productivity. There was improvement in the growth of TFP during the 
early phases of the output price support policy regime, when the growth rate achieved 
a highest (for this regime) of 1% in 1982. However, there was positive growth in TFP 
only until 1985. It reached a record minimum of – 1.5% in 1986, improved thereafter 
but remained negative until 1990. The output price support policy failed to sustain the 
favourable impacts of factor productivity due to its mismanagement and lack of 
institutional reforms towards improving factor market competition. Reform towards 
liberalization in the market for inputs brought in remarkable success in the early 
nineties. TFP growth rate reached a new peak of 2% in 1992, and continued to be 
nonnegative until 1995.    
 
We compute the time path of the incentive component of TFP, incentivesA , using the 
time series data on input costs and output price of rice. The growth in this component  
is presented in figure 3. There is clear evidence of incentive induced growth in TFP 
during the output price support policy regime (peak 6.3%) and current liberalized 
input markets regime (peak 6%). The fall in growth of incentive component in 1988 
may be attributable to heavy flood which resulted in huge crop damage. Its recovery 
in 1989 is perhaps due to bumper harvest. The overall trend of the incentive 
component of TFP growth during the reform periods (1982-1998) is quite interesting, 
revealing that farmers respond to policy changes that induce more incentives for 
enhancing factor productivity.  
 
When most inputs were subsidized and quantity was rationed (until 1980), farmers 
had no incentives to increase factor productivity in anticipation of competition in 
factor as well as product market in future. The growth rate of TFP and its incentive 
component experienced a boost with the introduction of output price support policy. 
In this phase of reform, due to the removal of direct input subsidies, agricultural factor 
markets became more competitive and all input prices had a growth rate which was 
higher than the output price growth rate. This growth was followed by a high growth 
of incentive- induced productivity. The beginning of nineties was characterized by a 
shift from more regulated policy regimes towards further liberalization in input supply 
side. Flat subsidies and supports were removed and replaced by more effective 
incentive devices such as fiscal waivers on licensing, privatization of fertilizer and 
seeds supply, institutional reforms such as introducing transferability of supply 
licenses (at market determined rate), improved and strategic land management 
schemes and increased volume of agricultural research. This corresponds to our 
finding that there was positive growth in incentive component of TFP during the 
nineties. Our results indicate that no matter how informal the agricultural labour 
market is, farmers respond sensibly to policy changes and market reforms that are 
directed towards generating more incentives for enhanced factor productivity. There 
is, obviously, a large component of TFP growth which we do not explain. This 
component can be accounted for unexplained factors such as weather variations or 
land fertility.  
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6. Concluding Remarks. 
 
We use a simple optimizing model, and our empirical study is based on an 
institutional production function which reflects not only the usual technical 
relationship between inputs and outputs, but also effort responses to the institutional 
and market arrangements within which farmers work. Assuming farmers choose their 
effort levels optimally, it is possible to estimate these incentive effects at each stage of 
reform and compare them with the overall change in TFP. We find that decomposing 
the incentive component of TFP in Bangladesh agriculture assists a great deal in 
explaining farmers’ response towards incentives in policy reform. Our results clearly 
show that the incentive component of TFP in rice production in Bangladesh has 
experienced steady increase during the most recent policy reform towards 
liberalization and deregulation of markets. 
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Data Appendix. 
The output data for rice is an aggregate rice production data; totalling all production of three 
major hybrids of rice produced in Bangladesh throughout the year, namely Aus, Aman and 
Boro. Production of all varie ties of these hybrids (local, transplanted and broadcast) are 
aggregated for total production of a particular category of hybrid, and all production of 
particular hybrid categories are aggregated for aggregate district/national production of rice in 
tonnes for cross sectional/time series data. Labour is measured as person-days and is obtained 
by multiplying average person-days per hectare in agriculture by the rice cultivated area 
divided by 300 days or one standard labour unit in one year. The land input is measured as the 
sown area of rice. The proportion of land that is used for rice production was measured 
deflating land area in hectares under cultivation of rice by total land area in hectares available 
for cropping throughout the year. This fraction for different districts, and as well for the 
country-wide level was used to transform other input variables for per hectare input usage. 
The seed input is calculated from the average use of hybrid seeds and it is measured in tonnes 
multiplied by proportion of land under rice cultivation. In this way we get how much seeds 
are used per hectare in rice production. The chemical fertilizer is calculated from the average 
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amounts of major hybrids of chemical fertilizer, namely, Urea, TSP, SSP and ASP, used per 
hectare in rice production. Time series data for rice prices for 1979-1998 was obtained from 
the survey of Bangladesh Rice Research Institute in different years and the database of 
SDNBD. All rice prices are average annual wholesale price of popular hybrids, valued in 
Taka (Bangladeshi currency) per mound (a rural unit of measurement of rice, where 1 mound 
= 40 Kg). Time series data on input prices for the period 1979-1998, used to construct the 
weighted-cost share parameter w, are collected mainly from Agricultural Statistical Yearbook 
of Bangladesh of BBS, and database of SDNBD. Chemical fertilizers and seeds prices are 
measured in Taka per kg labour price. Wage rates are aggregate average wage rates for male 
and female workers without meal. The land input price or land rental is measured by the 
amount of money farmers have to give to the land owner in local currency for each mound 
produced in 1 hectare of land during a cropping season. To get land rental paid per kg rice 
produced in 1 hectare of land, rental rates were divided by 40. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics of district level rice output and inputs (23 districts, 1997). 
Variable Description Mean (SD) Min Max 
Output Rice production in district i  (in 000 tonnes). 93.78 (21.77) 2.4 211.66 
Land Land area in district i  (in 000 hectares) under cultivation. 437.88 (16.49) 15.87 621.23 
Seed Improved seeds in district i  (in 000 tonnes). 124.04 (22.11) 20.78 299.02 
Fertilizer Fertilizer in district i  (in 000 tonnes). 72,054.02 (105.05) 2,643.16 1,12,211 
Labour Labour in district i  (in 000 work days). 3.48 (0.775) 1.802 6.15 
 
Figure 1: Country-wide time series of inputs and rice output (1977-1998). 
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Q , F  and S  are rice output, chemical fertilizers and improved seeds, in thousand tonnes, L  is land 
area under cultivation of rice, in thousand hectares, and N  is labour work days in thousand.  
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Table 2: OLS estimation results (Dependent variable: Qln ) 
Variable Name Estimate (s.e.) p-value 
Constant 0.377 (0.6703) 0.580 
ln(Labour) 0.220 (0.1009) 0.042 
ln (Land) 0.455 (0.0885) 0.000 
ln (Seeds) 0.176 (0.0600) 0.009 
ln (Fertilizer) 0.153 (0.0624) 0.024 
R-Square 0.9711  
R-Square Adjusted 0.9626  
Standard error of estimation 0.2203  
 
Table 3: Summary of likelihood ratio test for CRTS and Jarque-Bera test for testing normality of 
distribution of residuals. 
Null hypothesis Test Statistic Critical Value Decision 
)(14321 CRTS=+++ gggg  4.69 6.6349 Accept Null 
Normal distribution of OLS 
residuals  
7.7649 9.21 Accept Null 
 
Table 4: Heteroscedasticity tests  
Null hypothesis: Homoscedasticity 
( ºu residual 
ºqˆ predicted) 
c2 
statistic 
Critical 
c2 
At 5% 
level 
Decision 
2u on qˆ  0.221 3.8414 Accept Null 
2u on qˆ  0.199 3.8414 Accept Null 
2u on qˆln  0.241 3.8414 Accept Null 
B-P-G test 6.520 9.4877 Accept Null 
Harvey test 3.398 9.4877 Accept Null 
Glejser test 5.136 9.4877 Accept Null 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Ramsey RESET Specificati on test. 
Null hypothesis: Model correctly specified.  
 
F 
statistic 
Critical F 
at 5% 
level 
Decision 
RESET (2) 0.53783 4.45 Accept Null 
RESET (3) 0.34460 4.49 Accept Null 
RESET (4) 0.22324 4.54 Accept Null 
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Figure 2a: Price, profit per unit, TFP index and incentive component of TFP index (1977-1998). 
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Figure 2 b: Density and distribution (against normal) of TFP (A) and Incentive Component of 
TFP (Ainc) Index (1977-1998). 
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Figure 3: Growth in TFP and Incentive Component of TFP (1977-1998). 
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